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In this paper we investigate the relation between wage growth and labour 
mobility on a panel of Italian dependent workers observed between 1986 and 
1991.  We use an employer-employee linked panel of 30167 workers, built 
from Italian Social Security (INPS) administrative sources. 
 
In order to investigate the impact of individual vs. firm characteristics on 
wage dynamics, we decompose individual wage change 1986-91 in two 
parts: the mean wage growth observed across firms of origin and firms of 
destination (the two coincide for the stayers), and the wage premium gained 
over the mean wage change by movers attributable to their own personal 
characteristics. 
 
Our main findings may be summarized as follows: 
1  In general, movers do better than stayers at young age (20-30), but the 
difference tends to vanish as age progresses;  2 
2  mover-stayer differentials are larger among white-collars than blue-
collars, in line with the higher variance of earnings of the former; 
3  total wage growth is driven by the wage - firm size positive correlation 
only for the blue-collars: job-switches from small to large firms often yield 
substantial pay improvements relative to stayers; job switches from large to 
small size often end up in wage cuts. For the white-collars, however, job 
changes in either direction tend to improve one's position relative to stayers; 
4  there is a quasi-reverse pattern on the individual premiums of the 
blue-collars (switches from small to large carry negative premiums, 
from large to small positive). This is likely to be a consequence of firm-
based wage policies, the impact of which by far exceeds that 
attributable to individual characteristics 
5  personal characteristics contribute, instead, to determine the white-
collars' individual premiums. Job changes of adult and mature 
workers, presumably endowed with skills and experience, result in 
sizeable wage gains; 
6  all workers employed at firms that either close down or go through 
drastic employment cuts during the observation period suffer wage 
losses; 
7  prolonged unemployment spells have somewhat of a negative impact 
on the wage growth of white-collar employees (up to 5 p.p.), almost 
none on the blue-collars; 
8  a certain amount of job-switching has a positive effect on the wage 
growth of the younger white-collars. If job changes become too 
frequent, however, its positive impact vanishes; 
9  we find a rather strong effect of initial conditions on the wage profile of 
blue-collar employees, and almost none on the white-collars'; 
10  there is evidence of a trade-off between job security and pay in 
concomitance with a job-to-job switch. When adverse shocks are in sight - as 
was the beginning of the Nineties - it is reasonable that people may leave 
their current position, if it is perceived at risk, giving up some pay for longer 
expected tenure, or may choose to accept a higher pay with a less reliable 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper we investigate the relation between wage growth and labour 
mobility on a panel of Italian dependent workers observed between 1986 and 
1991.  We use an employer-employee linked panel of 30167 workers, built 
from Italian Social Security (INPS) administrative sources. 
 
Data relate to full-time male employees of all industries of the private sector, 
at work both in 1986 and 1991. For the time being we exclude women, in 
order to have better control over individual characteristics, and the 
construction sector, in view of its seasonal characteristics which interfere in 
the study of mobility 
 
We move from a stylized fact about working conditions, tenure and pay at 
various firm-types.  Ranking firms by size, the following emerges clearly: 
(i)  large firms pay better wages than small ones;  
(ii)       mean tenure at large firms is higher than at small enterprises; 
 
 
  Gross yearly earnings 1995  
(million Lit.) 
Mean duration of employment 
spells (years) 
firm size  white collars  blue collars  All 
< 20  29.6  25.6  2.0 
20-200 38.9  27.7  3.4 
200-500 44.6  29.6  5.3 
> 500  50.4  31.7  7.7 
Source: B. Contini, C. Malpede, L. Pacelli, F. Rapiti (1996) 
 
The former indication is in line with predictions from efficiency wage theory; 
the latter with two well known facts: (1) small firms are often short lived 
compared to the large ones; (2) job hierarchies are longer and more 




This study aims at establishing the impact of mobility on wage growth from 
various perspectives:   
 
1  Are there sizeable differentials between stayers and movers ? 
2  Does firm size affect wage growth for movers (across firms of different 
size) as much as it determines cross-sectional wage level differentials 
3  Does age matter, i.e. is the impact of job changes and firm size on wage 
growth the same between young and old workers  
4  Are there significant differences between what we identify as voluntary 
and involuntary job changes? 
2  
4  Are frequent movers better or worse off  than one-time movers ? 
5  Is there a trade-off between pay and expected job-security in the decision 
to move across jobs and firms, especially in time of recession  ? 
                                                 
1 Cfr. B. Contini and R. Revelli (1997) 
2 As will be explained, we proxy voluntary and involuntary movements by the employment 
pattern of the firms where job changes originate, as we have no direct elements  to identify 
quits or layoffs.  Where a large decline in firm size takes place in the observation period,  or 
where a close-out takes place, we presume that worker separations pre-empt a likely layoff in 
the near future, and therefore take them as involuntary movements. 
  4 
 
Our work has some similarities with other studies on wage growth: Hartog 
and Van Ophem (1994), for example, analyse wage growth of certain groups 
of employees discriminating between mobile and non-mobile employees, 
and between voluntary and non-voluntary job changes; C. Flinn (1986) 
analyses the intertemporal structure of wages for young workers separately 
for movers and stayers. He presents evidence that unobserved worker-firm 
heterogeneity is an important component in the wage growth of young 
workers. Farber (1993 and 1997) analyse the characteristics and the cost of 
job losses, finding that job losses adversely affects workers' earnings in 
many ways. Employment probabilities are reduced and an increased 
probability of working part-time yields lower earnings both through shorter 
hours and lower wage rates. The decline in real weekly earnings between 
the pre displacement job and the post displacement job averages about 13% 
for all reemployed displaced workers and about 9% for workers displaced 
from full-time job who are reemployed on full time job. In our study we focus 
only on workers employed full-time both in 1986 and in 1991, thus we are not 
able o point out the wage loss due to a switch from full to part time. However 
it is important to remind that the share of part time work on total employment 
was less than 2% in 1986 and less than 5% in 1991, involving mostly (80%) 
female workers, who are excluded from our analysis. 
 
The main contribution of our study, over much of the existing literature, 
derives from the linkage between workers and firms, that makes it possible to 
investigate in considerable detail the effects of mobility on wage growth. 
 
2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON STAYERS AND MOVERS 
2.1.  How many stayers and movers ? 
 
Our analysis is made on individual data from the Administrative Social 
Security (INPS) archives. We used a panel of workers matched to their firm 
of affiliation of approximately 100,000 workers each year from 1985 to 1991. 
From this panel we select a sample of 30167 full time workers, employed 
both in 1986 and in 1991 in the manufacturing and service sectors, and aged 
20-50 in 1986. We find two groups:  
 
(i)  20526  stayers (68%), employed at the same firm at the beginning 
and at the end of the observation period  (not necessarily   
uninterrupted spells) 
(ii)  9641 movers (32%), who make one or more job-changes during the 
1986-91 period. 64% of all movers go through only one job-switch,  
36%  undertake more than two
3.  
                                                 
3 Mobility in this panel is not  comparable to the separation and association rates estimated 
for the Italian economy at large (Contini et al., 1996): our current database consists of a 
closed panel of individuals employed as dependent workers both in 1986 and in 1991, as 
opposed to open panels which include all exits from and entry to employment. The mean 
annual separation rates observed from open panels from the same administrative source are 
in the order of  34% of dependent employment in the private sector. Not surprisingly, the 
overall separation rate is many times higher than the frequency of job changes observed in 
this closed panel.  5 
 
Tab. 1 Stayers and movers by individual and firm characteristics 
(percentages) 
 
   Movers Stayers 
ALL  32.0 68.0 
Stayers and movers by age and skill level    
Age 20-30  Blue  45.3  54.7 
 White  38.4  61.6 
Age 30-40  Blue  28.5  71.5 
 White  26.3  73.7 
Age 40-50  Blue  24.7  75.3 
 White  22.7  77.3 
Stayers and movers by industry    
 Energy, gas, water  12.6  87.5 
 Iron and steel, mining  32.6  67.4 
 Metalworking and mechanical industries  35.0  65.0 
 Food, textiles, paper  38.4  61.6 
 Wholesale and retail trade  41.1  58.9 
 Transport and communication  16.4  83.6 
 Finance  15.6  84.4 
Stayers and movers by firm size    
 0-20  44.3  55.7 
 20-200  32.6  67.4 
 >200  20.6  79.4 
 
Moves are more frequent among young workers, and decrease with ageing 
of the working force. Moves are also more frequent among blue-collars than 
white-collars. Almost half of the employed blue-collars aged 20-30 
experience at least one job change in the 1986-91 period. This is not 
unexpected: in those years youth were hired under 2-year "training-and-
work" contracts (CFL), not subject to renewal. At the end of the contract 
period, either the contract was changed into a regular one, or a job-change 
was necessary. 
 
Discriminating by sector of industry movers are more concentrated in the 
trade sector, and in food, textiles, and other traditional manufacturing.  Few 
movers are found in the public utilities (energy, gas and water ). 
 
Not surprisingly, the frequency of job-to-job switches is inversely proportional 
to firm-size: 44% of workers in our closed panel employed at small firms in 
1986 change jobs in the observation period; the same frequency falls to 33% 
for workers employed at  mid-size firms, and to 21% for workers of large 
firms.  This reflects three partially independent facts: (i) the high turnover of 
small-size businesses; (ii) the fact that high turnover is perceived by many 
workers as a threat to employment stability, and hence many employees of 
small firms would we willing to move to a larger establishment, although 
working conditions may be less pleasant than in the firm of origin; (iii)  pay 
increases with firm size. 
 
2.2.  Characteristics of job changes  
  6 
Focusing on movers we find that most of the changes takes place inside 
sectors: only few workers (less than 5%) moves from manufacturing to 
services, slightly more from services to manufacturing. 
 
Tab. 2 Frequency of job changes 1986-91 across different sector 
(percentages) 
 
  1991   
1986  Manufacturing Services  Total 
Manufacturing 95.4  4.6  100.0 
Services 7.9  92.1  100.0 
 
 
Looking at changes across firm size we can notice than many job shifts 
happen across firms of equivalent size
4. Moves towards larger firms are 
more frequent than moves in the reverse direction. The pattern is clearly 
visible in manufacturing, less so in the service industries. 
 
Tab. 3 Frequency of job changes 1986-91 across firms of different size 
(percentages) 
Manufacturing 
 Small  medium  large 
small   ( < 20)  56.2  33.7  10.1 
medium  (20- 500)  20.8  59.0  20.2 
large  (>  500 )  3.0  22.8  74.2 
Services 
 Small  medium  large 
small  ( < 20)  69.2  23.8  7.1 
medium  (20- 500)  22.7  45.0  32.3 
large  ( > 500 )  5.1  37.6  57.3 
 
 
Only 14% of movers move to firms located in a different province, and less 
than 5% change also macro geographical area (there are 5 in Italy).  
 
Tab. 4 Frequency of movers that undertake geographical mobility 
  N° in our panel  % of movers 
Movers who change province 
between 1986-1991 
1363 14.1 





Our data provide some information on occupational upgrading: (i) from blue-
collar contract to white-collar status; (ii) from white-collar to manager 
contracts.   
                                                 
4 We observe here only three size-classes,  which somewhat reduces the information of the 
two following tables  7 
 
Tab. 5 Frequency of occupational upgrading 
  Age 20-30  Age 30-40  Age 40-50 
  Blue White  Blue White  Blue White 
Movers  12.97 1.12 7.82 5.48 6.60 4.75 
Stayers  7.12 0.52 5.79 1.99 3.83 2.23 
 
Upgrading is quite frequent at young age for blue-collars who leave a manual 
job for a white-collar position.  Later in life it denotes promotions, often on-
the-job, from blue-collar to white-collar status.  Upgrading is a less frequent 
occurrence for the white-collars who get promoted to a manager position 
(never at young age, more often in concomitance with a job-change).  
 
2.3.  Wage levels  and  growth rates among movers and stayers 
 
An important question relates to the causes of job-change: is it voluntary or is 
it forced by the events ? Is it the final outcome of a process of job-search in 
which both workers and firms become involved, or is it – as it were - 
“imposed” on the workers by outside forces ? The latter is not at all an 
unlikely event: in the course of many recent episodes of industrial 
restructuring, large employment reductions are negotiated between 
management and unions. The outcome of the bargaining table is often an 
agreement to help the re-deployment of a consistent fraction of the work-
force to other firms, only at times belonging to the same financial group. In 
such a case, the most able workers may refuse re-deployment and do the 
job-shopping on their own, but many will take whatever is offered to them. 
We do not, unfortunately, have this type of information in our data. Nor do 
we know when job-changes are associated with voluntary quits or when they 
are consequent to firings. The latter may be “collective” if they originate from 
medium-large firms in the process of restructuring. 
 
We proceed by looking at the five-year trend of employment in the firms from 
which the job-changes originate. The idea is that, if a job-change originates 
in a business that has either closed down, or experienced a drastic 
employment cut in 1986-91, there are good reasons to suppose that such a 
movement is not voluntary. All those workers who fear the risk of losing their 
post in the near future for whatever reason, will, whenever possible, engage 
in early job-shopping in order to pre-empt a likely layoff. For these workers 
we predict that the pay levels in 1991 ought to be quite modest
5. On the 
other hand, a job-changer who leaves a rapidly growing firm is more likely to 
be a voluntary job-seeker: a comparatively high 1991-pay would confirm this 
hunch.  
 
We therefore classify firms in five groups on the basis of the employment 
trend observed between 1986 and 1991: 
1. Expansion, if between 1986 and 1991 the firm has increased its 
workforce; 
2.  Constant if no significant variation has happened in the firm employment; 
3.  Decline if in the 86-91 period the firm has reduced employment from 10 
to 40%; 
                                                 
5 See H. Farber (1997)  8 
4.  Strong decline if the decline is by more than 40%; 
5.  Closeout if the firms has closed in the period. In this case workers are 
necessarily movers. 
 
Table 6 Movers and stayers by firm of origin trend 
 Expanding  Constant  Declining  Strong 
decline 
Closing Total 
Movers  24.7  9.6 13.1 15.9 36.7  100 
Stayers  52.9 23.5 20.2  3.3  0  100 
 
Tables 7 contains means and standard deviations of monthly wages in 1986 
and 1991, and of the wage growth rate 1986-91, separately for movers and 
stayers. Moreover it reports the same statistics for movers and stayers 
classified by the trend in their firm of origin. 
 
Table 7 Monthly wages in 1986 and 1991 and wage growth rate 86-91 
for movers and stayers by different firm trends 
    Movers Stayers 
All    N Mean  Dev.std  N Mean  Dev.std 
  Wage  86  9641 1731.2  548.2  20526 1906.7  604.2 
  Wage  91  9641 2805.2 1138.3  20526 3042.3 1184.5 
  Wage  growth  rate  9641 1.6 0.4  20526 1.6 0.3 
By trend in the 
firm of origin  
        
Expansion  Wage  86  2227 1753.8  576.8  10858 1941.2  618.8 
  Wage  91  2227 2937.7 1261.3  10858 3146.7 1218.5 
  Wage  growth  rate  2227 1.68 0.42  10858 1.62 0.29 
Constant  Wage  86  870 1689.6  502.0  4831 1902.7  611.1 
  Wage  91  870 2799.2 1131.6  4831 3010.5 1202.3 
  Wage  growth  rate  870 1.66 0.42  4831 1.57 0.28 
Decline  Wage  86  1183 1713.4  521.0  4142 1837.2  533.1 
  Wage  91  1183 2780.6 1107.8  4142 2846.8 1022.3 
  Wage  growth  rate  1183 1.64 0.41  4142 1.55 0.28 
Strong decline  Wage 86  1439  1739.1  582.7  681  1811.4  675.7 
  Wage  91  1439 2768.1 1061.2  681 2802.5 1227.9 
  Wage  growth  rate  1439 1.61 0.36  681 1.55 0.33 
Closeout  Wage  86  3312  1742.5  541.4    
  Wage  91  3312 2775.1 1121.8       
 Wage growth rate  3312  1.60  0.37       
 
Some patterns come out clearly: 
 
(i)  the mean wage level (1986) of the stayers is more than 10 p.p. higher 
than that of the movers (before moving) in all groups; 
(ii)  the mean wage level (1991) of the stayers is about 5% higher than 
that of the movers (after moving) in the group of expanding or 
constant-employment firms. It is marginally higher among the 
declining firms; 
(iii)  the movers' wage growth rate is always higher than the stayers' in all 
groups of firms;  
(iv)  the standard deviation of the movers' growth rate is much higher than 
the stayers';  9 
(v)  for both movers and stayers employed at expanding firms the mean 
wage 1986 and 1991 is notably higher than in all other groups of 
firms. 
 
All these descriptive statistics confirm shared knowledge: workers with lower 
wages find encouragement in job searching and subsequent change; the 
wage growth of movers is higher than that of the stayers (especially at young 
age and for white-collars), but variability is also higher. On average, however, 
the mean wage of the stayers at the end of the observation period, is still 
above that of the movers. 
Workers who change employer between 1986 and 1991 have in general, a 
higher wage growth rate, but discriminating by age and occupation (table 7) 
we can find that for white collars the wage growth rate of the movers is 
always higher than that of stayers; for blue collars, whose earning careers 
are flatter, this happen only among young workers (aged 20-30) 
 
Table 8 Wage growth for different occupational status and age groups 
AGE OCCUPATION  STAYER  MOVERS 
20-30 BLUE  1.56  1.6 
 WHITE  1.77  1.9 
30-40 BLUE  1.53 1.52 
 WHITE  1.71  1.78 
40-50 BLUE  1.51 1.51 
 WHITE  1.64  1.67 
 
 
3. THE MODEL 
 
Let W(i;jk) be the wage change (1986-91) for the i-th individual who has 
moved from firm-type j (in 1986)  to firm-type  k  (in 1991).  If he/she is a 
stayer, then j=k.  Firm-types refer here to size and industry. 
 
If, as we assume here, firm characteristics have a large impact on wage 
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where   
 







mean wage growth 1986-91 observed across firm-type   
j (origin) in 1986  and firm-type  k (destination) in 1991 has been added and 
subtracted to the expression for the wage change.  The decomposition then 
reads as follows: 
 
 



















































=  [II]    10 
 
where : 
) ( ˆ jk w  is the mean wage growth 1986-91 observed across firm-type j (origin) 
in 1986  and firm-type  k (destination) in 1991; 
 
) ( jk w′  = wage premium (or loss) accruing to the i-th individual in moving 
from firm-type j  to firm-type k,  i.e. the extra-pay that individuals with certain 
characteristics are able to gain (or lose) over the mean wage change  ) ( ˆ jk w . 
 
That is to say: 
 
“total” individual wage growth 1986-91  =  = ′ + = jk) (i; w (jk) w jk) W(i; ˆ   
=mean wage growth across firms of origin and destination 
(attributable to firm characteristics)  + wage individual premium  
 
The total wage growth associated to a move from firm-type j  to firm-type k  is 
given, in first place, by the mean pay differential between the firm of origin in 
1986  and that of destination in 1991. It can be assumed that this does not 
depend on the workers’ individual characteristics (only at very small firm size, 
2 - 3 employees, this may not be the case). In second place, by an individual 
premium  that reflects various characteristics of the match, i.e. determined by 
the interaction of  both workers’ and firm’s attributes.   
 
The w'(jk) component may be retrieved from the databases (from average 
pay in 1986 and 1991 for different skill levels - blue and white collars - and  
firm-types, however defined).  By difference w(i;jk) - w^(jk), we then obtain   
w'(i;jk). 
 
w'(i;jk) may  be expressed as a linear function of X exogenous regressors of 
various types and residuals: 
[1]  w’(i;jk) =   B
I  X
I  + B
F  X
F  +  B
Z    X
 Z  +  u 
where  the superscripts  I, F, Z denote regressors associated respectively 
with individual characteristics, firm characteristics, and general macro-
indicators. 
 
Likewise, with no loss of generality, we may think  w^(jk)  as written as 
another linear function of the same X regressors  and residuals: 
 
[2]  w^(jk) =   b
I  X
I  + b
F  X
F  +  b
Z    X
 Z  +  w 
 
where all the b
I  (reflecting purely individual characteristics) will be equal to 
zero. 
 
“Total” individual wage growth is written as the sum of two linear functions of 
the same regressors: 
 
[3]   w(i;jk)  =   (B
I  + b
I  ) X
I  + (B
F  + b
F  )X
F  + (b
Z  +  B
Z  )
 X
 Z  +  (u + w) 
 
We perform separate estimation of both [1] and [3]. From the estimates of 
the three sets of (B + b) and B, we shall then obtain indirect estimates of b. 
The latter provide additional conditions for identification. In particular, we  11 
expect the estimates of (B
I + b
 I ) to be approximately equal to B




Notice that we use a closed panel observed from 1986 to 1991 to construct 
the data-set, and that estimation is done on only one observation for each 
individual in the panel. Thus, while there is no room for panel estimation with 
unobservable, time-invariant, individual effects in equations 1 and 3,  we 
cannot simply do away with initial conditions that could influence the wage 
growth in the five-year period 1986-91.  Our choice for a proxy of initial 
conditions is the i-th individual's relative wage in 1986, i.e. the ratio between  
w(i,86)  and  the average wage 1986 of all individuals belonging to the same 
cell (age x industry x skill level).  To the extent that one’s relative initial wage 
reflects also individual characteristics, this approach ought to yield 
satisfactory results
6. To these results, and to the consequences of possible 
endogeneity of our proxy, we will return in the presentation of the estimates. 
 
3.1. Estimation   
 
The equations object of estimation are [1] and [3], whose residuals are 
correlated. In fact: 
E[u (u+w)] = E(u
2) = var (u)  
if u and w are orthogonal, as can be safely assumed. 
In principle, therefore,  we have a case of seemingly unrelated regressions, 
The two equations have, by construction, identical regressors: thus OLS  will 




We made the point that by separately estimating equations [1] and [3],  we 
have conditions for identification: the coefficients b'  associated to individual 
characteristics X
I   ought to be zero in equation  [2], explanatory of the wage 
growth attributable to firm effects only. Thus, we  expect  the estimates of  (B
I  
+ b
 I ) to be approximately equal to  B
 I, implying  b
I   = 0.  
 
F-tests of the above null hypothesis are performed on the coefficients of all 
the  X
I  variables (10 in all) estimated in equations [1] and  [3], in six different 
specifications  (3 age-groups  x  2  occupational categories).  Only in one, of 
sixty replications of the test,  is the null  rejected; in three cases acceptance 





4. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
                                                 
6  Another approach to the problem is that of Stewart, Swaffield (1998). To solve the problem 
of sample selection bias due to correlation across time between the unobservable, they use 
extra variables as instruments for the selection probability into the initial state. 
7  A complete set of results is available on request.  12 
We must take an additional step in order to have a model specification 
coherent with the quality of the data at hand. 
In principle  X
I   and   X
F    reflect individual and firm characteristics.  Are our 
data adequate to yield a satisfactory representation of  X
I   and  X
F   ? 
 
(X
I  ):  education is not observable.  As already pointed out
8, we do not 
believe this to be a major problem, with the possible exception for young 
workers.  We find indirect confirmation of this hunch later on. 
 
(X
F  ): our firm data are rich in some respects (industrial classification, 
geography, employment and earnings history by skill level and size, firm age, 
entry and exit flags), and weak in others. In particular, we have no data on 
performance, market power, financial structure.  
 
In the estimation of the individual premium [3], we take out firm effects from 





















constructed controlling for: 1-digit industry, firm size, geography, skill 
category. We are unable, however, to control for performance and market 
related variables. Thus, their impact cannot be removed from the individual 
premium w' (i;jk). This affects also w^(j,k), calculated as difference, which 
denotes the firm effect. Given the structure of our data, it is probably safer to 
refer to the latter simply as "residual effect", rather than "firm-specific effect" 
as would be appropriate with ideal data
9. 
 
Let us now turn to the specification that we intend to estimate. Estimation of 
[1] and [3] is performed separately on 3 age groups (20-30; 30-40; 40-50) 
and 2 skill groups (Blue and White collars). The regressors are as follows (all 
the * are 0-1 dummies) : 
 
X
I   regressors  (14) 
Activated for movers and stayers 
INEQ86    initial (1986) relative wage  (proxy for initial conditions)    
AGE Age 
UN-MOV  unemployment spell between jobs  (in months), movers 
UN-STA  unemployment spell between jobs  (in months), stayers 
MOV-2   (*)  2 job changes in the observation period 
MOV-3   (*)  3 job changes in the observation period 
MOV-4   (*)  more than 3 job changes in the observation period 
DAV (*)  occupational upgrading  (from blue to white collars and from white to 
                                                 
8 Bonjour Pacelli (1998) tested on Swiss data the size and the direction of the bias that 
happen when age is used as a proxy for education and experience. They find that using age 
leads to a small bias for male and full time working female. The bias is bigger for all female 
(who are excluded from our analysis) due to the effect of part time female. Hartog and Van 
Ophem (1994) find that education has little or no effect on wage growth in relation to mobility. 
 
9  The problem may be seen as follows.  Let  F  be  a vector of firm performance and market 
related variables that affect   w^(j,k).   The system [1] - [3]  is then written for short: 
[1']     w'(i;j,k) =  B X +  u 
[2']     w^(j.k)  =  b X + c F  +  w 
[3']     w (i;j,k) =  (B + b) X +  c F +  (u + w) 
If  F  is not available, it will be omitted from [3'], and the OLS estimate of  (B + b) will be 
biased, converging to   (B + b) +  c [ cov (X, F) /  var (X) ].  Thus the firm effect  b, retrieved 
from [1'] and [3'],   will be itself biased,  unless  X and F  are uncorrelated.    
  13 
manager occupation) 
DZO (*)  geographical mobility 
DZO*DOWN (*)   geographical mobility for workers belonging to firms in group 4 or 5 (see 
par. 2)  
SET01 (*)  intersectoral mobility (from manufacturing to services) 
SET10 (*)   intersectoral mobility (from services to manufacturing) 
SET01*DOWN (*)  intersectoral mobility (from manufacturing to services) for workers 
belonging to firms in group 4 or 5 (see par. 2) 
SET10*DOWN  (*)  intersectoral mobility (from services to manufacturing) for workers 
belonging to firms in group 4 or 5 (see par. 2) 
 
(DOWN is a 0-1 dummy activated if the firm of origin has had a strong 
decline in employment or has closed in the 86-91 period - firm belonging to 
group 4 or 5 as described in §2 -) 
 
X
F   regressors  (49) 
 
Activated for movers and stayers  (12) : 
R1 -->  R8    (*)  industrial sector 
SMALL - LARGE  (*)  firm size 1986 
NOV-NES-SUD-ISO  (*)  4 geographical dummies (firm location) 
 
Activated only for stayers (1): 
DOWN-STA (*)  Firm has had a strong decline in employment in 
the period (firm in  group 4) 
 
Activated only for movers  (36): 
DM1 --> DM9     (*)  job-change across firm size (manufacturing) 
DS1 --> DS9   (*)  job-change across firm size (services) 
DM1 --> DM9  * DOWN    job-change  across  firm  size  (manufacturing)  for 
workers belonging to firms in group 4 or 5 
DS1 --> DS9   * DOWN  job-change across firm size (services) for workers 
belonging to firms in group 4 or 5 
 
 
Most of the above variables are self-explanatory.  
For each branch 9  dummies are associated with job-changes involving 
movements across firms classified by size  (DM1 - DM9  for manufacturing;   
DS1- DS9 for services).  We distinguish small firms (< 20 employees), 
medium firms  (20 -200 employees ) and large firms ( > 200 employees ).  
Thus we have  3 x 3= 9  "types" of job-change.  The associated  variables 
are  activated as follows: 
 
 
      1   i-th individual moves from firm-type j to firm-type k 
  D (i; jk)  =                               ( j, k = 1,2,3 )   
                                0    otherwise 
 
If the i-th individual is a "stayer" in the observation period, none of the D 
dummies are activated.   
In addition, we use the grouping of firms proposed in par. 2 in order to catch 
the effect of a closeout or drastic downsizing of the firm of origin on job-
changes.  All the D variables above are interacted with a dummy activated if 
the firm of origin has either closed down or drastically reduced its work-force 
in the 1986-91 period.  When DOWN is activated,  we treat job changes as 
involuntary, i.e. workers are - as it were - forced by the events to move to a 
different job.  14 
 
Additional controls are provided by MOV-2 through  MOV-4, which we place 
among the X(I) regressors:  frequent job changes may reflect a positive 
attitude towards job search, and have a positive impact on wages.  There 
could be, however, decreasing returns beyond a certain amount of job-
switching, which our specification allows to catch. 
 
Spells of unemployment (UN-MOV; UN-STA) may be observed for movers 
between successive jobs, and for stayers if their tenure is interrupted. The 
longer the spell, the higher the reduction of one's earning potential as a 




In principle DAV, which reflects career advancement, should be treated as 
endogenous. However, the majority of DAV events reflect the institutional 
nature of certain contracts. Such upgradings - for instance, the conversion of 
two-year training-and-work contracts (CFL) into regular, unlimited time 
contracts, take place almost independently of the individual's conduct at 
work, and may be regarded as exogenous and firm-related,  rather than 
reflecting individual characteristics. 
 
5. THE RESULTS 
 
We report here the main result divided by group of variables. The full set of 
results are available upon request. Estimation is performed separately for 
each age-group. Age turns out to be a useful control, as the coefficients that 
explain wage dynamics across firms of different size are quite sensitive to 
age
11.  
5.1.  Job switches across firm size 
It is convenient to start discussing together the impact of age and firm-size 
on wage change. 
Here below four summary tables (A.1 -A.4) are displayed: each contains 
three matrices of  OLS regression estimates of the coefficients associated to 
job-switches across firms by size (activated only for movers; the stayers 
constitute the benchmark).  The top matrix (denominated "total") reports the 
(B + b)  coefficients  of the 9 dummies related to the switches across firm 
size, estimated on [3]. The middle matrix  (denominated "premium")  reports 
the  same 9 B  coefficients estimated on [1]. The bottom matrix   
(denominated "firm (residual)" )  reports the  9 b  coefficients retrieved as 
differences of the two above,  only when both are significant.   Elsewhere, 
only the signs of the difference are shown. 
                                                 
10  In principle, we could observe a humped-shape effect of its length on wage growth:  the 
longer the search period, the higher the chance of finding a good match, up to a point where 
the loss of visibility / working ability overtakes the effect of the search effort.  This would 
require a squared term as an additional regressor, which we have not, however, included in 
the estimation reported here. 
11 We estimated the same specification for all age-groups together, and find results that are 
quite similar, but not as neat as those reported here.   Age and age square turn out  very 
significant, but the upward concave curvature of wage growth is extremely slight.          15 
Moreover the middle matrix shows, in parenthesis, the individual premium 
net of the "down effect", that is to say the individual premium for workers 
leaving a firm belonging to group 4 or 5 (drastic reduction or closure). When 
missing, the relative DOWN variable is non significantly different from zero.  
In several cases the individual premium is not reported (meaning that the 
coefficient is about zero), but the DOWN coefficient is. 
 
Each matrix has three rows, corresponding to separate estimates for three 
age-groups:  age 1 (20-30),  age 2 (30-40), and  age 3 (40-50). 
Significance of the coefficient are indicated in this way: 
***  significant at 99% 
**  significant at 95% 
*  significant at 90% 
 not  significant 
 
Moving across the columns of each 3x3  table (from left to right) denotes 
the effect of a job switch ending in firms of increasing dimension. Moving 
across the rows (from high to low)  catches a job switch  originating from 
firms of increasing dimension.  Thus in the North-East corner above the 
diagonal we have job-switches from small to large; in the South-West corner 
from large to small. 
 
The four following tables show the coefficient for: 
A.1 = blue collars / manufacturing 
A.2=  white collars / manufacturing 
A.3 = blue collars / service industries 
A.4 = white collars / service industries  16 
 
We emphasize the following : 
 
(i)  a very general remark:  there are more significant coefficients in the 
regressions of white-collars (A.2 - A.4) than of blue-collars (A.1 - A.3).  This 
simply means that  mover-stayer differentials are larger among white-collars:  
this is in line with the higher variance of earnings commonly found with white-
collars; 
 
(ii)  age matters when it comes to stay vs. move decisions: the estimated 
coefficients differ considerably among age-groups, although, as will be seen,  
few clear patterns emerge; 
 
(iii)  total wage growth  (top matrix): job-switches from small to large firms 
(NE corner)  have positive coefficients; when job-switches occur in the 
reverse direction  (SW corner), the coefficients are negative.  This is very 
clear in A.1 and A.3  (blue-collars / manufacturing and services), a straight 
consequence of the strong correlation between earnings and firm size, and 
of the predictably modest career profiles of blue-collar workers.  
If we turn to white-collars (A.2 and A.4)  job-switches in either direction often 
yield positive differentials relative to stayers in all age-groups;  
   
(iv) individual  premiums  (middle matrix):  here there is a visible, almost 
reverse, pattern only among the blue-collars of manufacturing  (A.1): sparce 
negative coefficients in the NE-corner;  positive in the SW-corner.   Wage 
growth (or loss) for these workers appears to be a consequence of firm-
based wage policies, rather than individual characteristics.    
Individual characteristics matter, instead, for all the white-collars. To these 
we return shortly; 
 
(v)  it is worth emphasizing the magnitude of individual premiums for the 
white-collars who move from  larger to  smaller  firms:  between 60% to 70%  
in manufacturing (cell 3,1, tab. A.2); between 40% to 132% in  the services 
(cells 2,1 and 3,1, tab. A.4).  Substantial wage gains by able young 
individuals (age 20-30) are not surprising:  they often occur when temporary, 
two-year "training-and-work" contracts are converted into regular contracts.  
It is more interesting, instead, to find such gains with more mature workers 
(ages 30-40 and 40-50).   As explained  before,  these moves do not appear 
to be "forced by events", but rather the result of voluntary job-seeking by 
individuals endowed with valuable skills and experience;   
 
(vi)  let us now turn to the interaction on the switches with the DOWN 
dummy variables:  these variables are activated when the firms of origin 
have either closed down or drastically reduced their work-force in the 1986-
91 period. All the DOWN dummies are interacted with the job-change D(i;k,j) 
variables for the movers.  In addition, we introduce DOWN-STAY associated 
to stayers. Thus the estimated coefficients denote the wage loss that people 
suffer, whether  moving or staying, attributable to the fact that they are on 
payroll at ailing firms, belonging to the "down" group. As already explained 
our hypothesis is that, when DOWN is activated, workers are - as it were - 
forced by the events to either move or stay. The estimates strongly support 
this hypothesis:  all coefficients are negatively signed, often very significantly   17 
(with very few exceptions). The individual premium, net of DOWN effect, is 
shown in parenthesis in tab. A.1- A.4. The effect of DOWN on the switch 
coefficient is shown in parenthesis in tab. A.1- A.4.  
The DOWN effect is very often present in tab. A.1 and A.2  (manufacturing, 
more among manual workers than white-collars), but also in A.3 and A.4 
(services). It is especially noticeable among the young and the old: middle 
aged blue-collars appear to be less affected by the large restructuring 
processes that prelude down-sizing and closure in the manufacturing 
industries. Middle aged white collars are, instead, severely hit in the services.  
The magnitude of the DOWN effect is striking: in tab. A.3 the individual 
premium of young blue-collars switching from a small firm to a large one (cell 
1,3) falls from  + 66% to -7%; if the switch is from large to large (cell 3,3) the 
premium drops from  +52% to  -14%. In tab. A.4 the premium accruing to 
prime-age white-collars moving out of small firms falls from +42% to 13% if 
the worker moves from a small to a small firm and from 76% to-10% if he 
moves from a small to medium firms. All this strongly suggests that job-
switches associated with DOWN events are all but voluntary quits.  
 
(vii)  in contrast to the above, can we make inference on the successful 
job-seekers ?  Take the workers for whom the individual premium is high and 
exceeds the total wage growth.  The decomposition  [II]  indicates that,  in 
such cases,  the firm effect is negative
12  and that any wage gain should be 
attributed mainly to individual factors (skill, experience, etc.)
13. Those of 
interest here are the age groups 2 and 3, where genuine experience may be 
found, especially when the job-switch originates from a large firm that has 
not been affected by downsizing events.  Indeed, we find large individual 
premiums, between 40% and 75%, among the white-collars in cells (2,1) and 
(3,1) - tab. A.2 and A.4 -   without  the devastating effect of DOWN that casts 
doubts on the voluntary nature of the moves.  These are, with all likelihood, 
voluntary moves of  able workers who have done good job-hunting while on-
the-job, free from the threat of being dismissed or transferred in years of 
recession;    
 
(viii)   the magnitude of the firm effect, obtained as difference between the 
total effect and the individual premium and renamed "residual", cannot be 
judged independently from the significance of its components.    We, 
therefore, display figures only when both are significant.   When either fails to 
reach  significance,  we show only the sign of the estimated firm effect.   The 
signs show a remarkable pattern, common to all four tables of firm effects 
and age-groups:  all are positive above the main diagonal  (N-W corner);  all 
are negative below  (S-E corner).  The F-test on the joint significance of 
these signs above and below the diagonal passes with flying colors. This 
result is not unexpected: the wage growth attributed only to firm effects is 
positive when job changes take place from smaller to larger firms, controlling 
for 1-digit industry and geographical location; it is negative when the direction 
of job change is reversed.  Once again, the wage - size positive correlation 
overshadows all other effects. 
                                                 
12  We have already pointed out some of the problems that  affect the significance of the firm 
effect.     
13 As pointed out in (v), the large wage premiums that may accrue to young workers (age 20-
30)  is explained by institutional factors (training-and-work 2-year contracts converted into 









1  0.10 *    0.10 **     0.07     
2  -0.02     0.04      0.18    
3  0.41 ***    0.23 *     0.64 **   
                 
1  -0.09 **    0.02      0.15 ***   
2  -0.13 **    0.01      -0.02    
3  0.11 *    0.02      0.00     
                 
1  -0.16 *    -0.11 **     0.04    
2  -0.21 **    -0.02      0.00    
3  -0.27 **    -0.05      0.01    





1  0.14 ***  -(0.01)  -0.04      -0.23 **    
2  0.01      -0.13 *     -0.19     
3  0.36 ***  (0.05)  0.02      0.29     
                
1  0.08 **     0.00      -0.01    -(0.14) 
2  0.07      0.02      -0.21 ***    
3  0.24 ***     0.02      -0.16 ***    
                
1  0.16      0.05      0.06     
2  0.15      0.17 ***    -0.01     





1  -0.04     +     +    
2  -     +     +    
3  0.05     +     +    
                
1  -0.17     +     +    
2  -     -     +    
3  -0.13     +     +    
                
1  -     -     -    
2  -     -     +    
3  -     -     -     19 
Table A2 White collars - manufacturing 
 




1  0.10     0.34 **    0.89 **   
2  -0.03     0.38 **    0.03    
3  0.08     0.47 *    -0.10    
                
1  -0.06     0.13 **    0.28 ***   
2  -0.20 **    0.17 ***    0.05    
3  0.03     0.07     -0.03    
                
1  0.31     0.31 ***    0.24 ***   
2  0.40 ***    0.22 ***    0.11 **   
3  0.34 *    0.03     0.03    
                




1  0.30      0.14      0.47     
2  -0.06       0.15   -(0.30)  -0.31  **     
3  0.11      0.24      -0.44     
                
1  0.28 ***     0.15 ***     0.16 *    
2  0.09    (0.33) 0.19  ***  (0.07) 0.01       
3  0.12      0.12 **     -0.15 *    
                
1  0.65 **     0.41 ***     0.20 ***    
2  0.74 ***     0.33 ***  (0.10)  0.12 **  -(0.04) 
3  0.63 ***     0.20 ***     0.03     
                




1  -     +     +    
2  +     +     +    
3  -     +     +    
                
1  -     -0.02     0.13    
2  -     -0.02     +    
3  -     -     +    
                
1  -     -0.10     0.04    
2  -0.34     -0.11     -0.01    
3  -0.29     -     +     20 
Table A3 Blue collars - services 
 




1  0.05     -0.04     1.03 ***   
2  -0.04     0.35 ***    0.27 **   
3  -0.01     -0.16     0.29    
                
1  -0.01     0.05     0.10    
2  -0.10     -0.04     -0.03    
3  0.01     -0.19 *    0.06    
                
1  -0.30     -0.39 *    0.50 **   
2  -0.46 **    -0.30 ***    -0.15 ***   
3  0.02     -0.21     0.02    
                
                




1  0.09      -0.13      0.66 **  -(0.07) 
2  0.02      0.18      -0.07     
3  0.06      -0.31      -0.26     
                
1  0.18 ***    0.08      -0.17     
2  0.15 **     0.01      -0.19     
3  0.23      0.14      -0.20 *    
                
1  0.02      -0.19      0.52 **  -(0.15) 
2  -0.07      -0.07      -0.18 ***    
3  0.42      -0.01      -0.06     
                




1  -     +     0.37    
2  -     +     +    
3  -     +     +    
                
1  -     -     +    
2  -     -     +    
3  -     -     +    
                
1  -     -     -0.01    
2  -     -     0.03    
3  -     -     +     21 
Table A4 White collars - services 
 




1  -0.13     0.11     0.33    
2  0.28 *    0.46 **    0.28    
3  -0.01     0.37 **    0.10    
                
1  0.00     0.26 ***    -0.02    
2  0.16      0.18 **    0.09    
3  0.13     -0.07     0.25 ***   
                
1  0.79  ***    0.11     0.08    
2  -0.01     0.05     0.12    
3  -0.63 **    0.12     0.23 **   
                




1  0.04      -0.21      -0.03     
2  0.42 ***  (0.13)  0.76 ***  -(0.10)  -0.10     
3  0.21 ***     0.08      -0.32     
                
1  0.41 ***     0.22 ***     -0.15     
2  0.57 ***  (0.31)  0.19 **     0.00     
3  0.59 ***     -0.03      0.11    -(0.08) 
                
1  1.33 ***     0.13      0.08     
2  0.53 ***     0.15 **     0.10     
3  -0.16      0.28 ***     0.19     
                




1  -     +     +    
2  -0.14     -0.30     +    
3  -     +     +    
                
1  -     0.04     +    
2  -     -0.01     +    
3  -     -     +    
                
1  -0.54     -     +    
2  -     -     +    
3  -     -     +     22 
 
In what follows we will briefly present the results related to the other 
regressors,  focusing mainly on total wage growth
14. 
5.2.  Geographical Location   
There is a modest geographical effect on wage growth.  Central Italy is the 
benchmark:  we observe a slight advantage for the blue-collars of Northern 
Italy, more marked for young workers.  On the other hand, the white-collars 
of Southern Italy and Islands are at some disadvantage compared to their 
colleagues of the North and Centre. 
 
Table 9 The impact of geographical location on total  wage growth (standard 
errors in parenthesis) 
 North-west  North-east  Centre  South  Islands 
AGE 1 BLUE C.  0.057 ***  0.053 ***  Benchm.  -0.004  -0.004 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
AGE 2 BLUE C.  0.018 **  0.027 ***  Benchm.  0.005  -0.022 
  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.015) 
AGE 3 BLUE C.  0.021 **  0.028 **  Benchm.  0.019  -0.018 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.019) 
AGE 1 WHITE C.  0.019  0.024  Benchm.  -0.063 **  -0.007 
  (0.019)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.039) 
AGE 2 WHITE C.  0.008  0.012  Benchm.  -0.026  -0.078 *** 
  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
AGE 3 WHITE C.  0.02  0.019  Benchm.  0.002  -0.051 * 
  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.028) 
 
5.3. Unemployment  spells 
 
The absence of certain individuals from the panel between successive jobs 
indicates - with high probability - periods spent in unemployment 
15. The 
length of such spells has a slight, but nonetheless significant, impact on total 
wage growth. The reduction of wage growth at the end of the observation 
period is only 1% for young (age-group 1) and "old" (age-group 3) blue-
collars. The very skilled manual workers have always been in high demand, 
regardless of the cycle: many have been forced into early retirement by 
restructuring businesses, but few ever move into unemployment. For the 
unskilled, instead, there is never any real skill obsolescence due to 
unemployment.  
                                                 
14 The coefficients of the industry dummies, not reported here, show the expected signs: 
workers in the food, textile and paper sector, white collars in the commerce and transport 
sector, have a wage growth rate lower than those in the metalmachinery sector; while 
working in the energy, gas and water sector and in finance increase wage growth. The 
estimated models discussed so far include 8 industry dummies (1-digit classification). We 
have also replicated the estimation with 2-digit classification (45 dummies) to improve the 
overall fit as numerous industries turn out highly significant. All the other coefficients, 
however, remain unchanged. 
15 Unemployment cannot be recorded with certainty in our data-base. The likelihood of 
moving into self-employment is a little over 5% of all separations; that of entering the irregular 
economy, unknown, may be high expecially in the South, but mainly for those who have 
never been regularly employed before (which is not the case with a closed panel like ours). 
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Not unexpectedly, the negative impact of prolonged unemployment spells is 
somewhat higher for the white-collars, climbing to 5% and 4% respectively 
for young and old workers. For the latter, skill obsolescence and / or loss of 
visibility in the labour market appears to be somewhat of a problem. 
 
This result confirms the hypothesis that the careers of those who remain blue 
collars all their life -basically low skilled manual workers- are flat and 
therefore unaffected by spells of unemployment, provided they are back on 
the job by the end of the observation period. A career interrupted by periods 
spent in unemployment does, instead, seriously hinder the earning projects 
of the white collars. 
 
Table 10 The impact of intervening unemployment spells on total wage 
growth  (unemployment duration in months) 
 
  1 month  6 months 
  Movers Stayers Movers Stayers 
AGE 1 BLUE C.  -0.001 ***  -0.001  -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.000)  (0.001)     
AGE 2 BLUE C.  0.000  -0.001  n.s.  n.s 
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
AGE 3 BLUE C.  -0.001 *  -0.001 **  -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
AGE 1 WHITE C.  -0.004 ***  0.002  -0.024  n.s. 
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
AGE 2 WHITE C.  -0.003 ***  0.000  -0.018  n.s. 
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
AGE 3 WHITE C.  -0.003 ***  -0.001  -0.018  n.s. 
 (0.001)  (0.001)     
 
 
5.4.  Frequency of job changes 
 
Frequent job switching could be a signal of intense search behaviour, and 
therefore associated with higher wage growth.  On the other hand, too many 
job-changes could reflect the precariousness of certain positions of low-skill 
contents, or characterised by a great deal of uncertainty. 
Estimation provides interesting insight:  in the blue-collar positions there is no 
visible impact.  Among the white-collars, instead, a certain amount of job-
switching has positive effect on wage growth, but only among people in age-
groups 1 and 2  (i.e.  less than 40 yrs. old):  two moves do better than one; 
three do better than two; but four (or more) flattens the wage profile back to 
the level of the stayers.   
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Frequency of job changes:  impact on wage growth  
BLUE- 
COLLARS 
2  MOVES  3 MOVES  4 >  MOVES 
age  20 - 30  0  0  0 
age  30 - 40  0  0  0 
age  40 - 50  0  0  0 
WHITE-COLLARS     
age  20 - 30  0.08 **  0.167 ***  0 
age  30 - 40  0.108 ***  0.115 **  0 
age  40 - 50  0.061 *  0  0 
 
5.5. Initial  conditions 
 
Wage growth in the period 1986-91 may be influenced by unobservable, 
individual effects like intellectual endowment, entrepreneurial attitudes, risk 
propensity, and the like.    
In this study we cannot perform panel estimation that would help to reduce 
the bias attributable to unobservable, time-invariant, individual effects in 
equations 1 and 3.  We proxy  initial conditions by the i-th individual's relative 
wage in 1986 (INEQ86), i.e. the ratio between  w(i,86)  and  the average 
wage 1986 of individuals belonging to the same cell (age x industry x skill 




There could be a problem of endogeneity of this proxy: 1986 seldom 
coincides with the beginning of one's working career (safe for very few young 
workers). Thus, endowed individuals may have a higher initial relative wage, 
and INEQ86 may be correlated with the residuals.  Estimation via 
instrumental variables could be an appropriate strategy.  
An alternative strategy, which we follow here, consists of estimating two 
versions of equations [1] and  [3]: one including  INEQ86 among the 
regressors, the other excluding it.   Consider the following  outcome: (1) the 
coefficient estimates are very similar in the two versions ; (2) the overall 
fitness improves only marginally when INEQ86 is included among the 
regressors; (3) the residuals are nearly identical.  If (1), (2) and (3) are 
verified together, the implication is that initial conditions do not matter, and 
that simultaneity bias is not much of a problem here. 
 
The following table displays the outcome of this exercise. Recall that a 
negative coefficient for INEQ86  is expected by construction as w(i,86) is the 
denominator of the dependent variable: 
                                                 
16 Farber  and Gibbons (1991), among others, find a strong correlation through time between 
wages and proxies of ability.    25 
 
Total 
  Mean  #  TSS  Coeff. INEQ  Std. Err.  R
2 with INEQ R
2 without 
INEQ 
Age1/B 1.58  7533  813  -0.659  0.018  0.227  .068 
Age1/W 1.82  2785  423  -0.236  0.032  0.144  .102 
Age2/B 1.53  7000  537  -0.355  0.016  0.132  .053 
Age2/W 1.73  4018  465  -0.042  0.02  0.142  .086 
Age3/B 1.51  5882  443  -0.323  0.016  0.111  .039 
Age3/W 1.65  2949  250  -0.075  0.019  0.114  .047 
 
Premium 
  Mean  #  TSS  Coeff. INEQ  Std. Err.  R
2 with INEQ R
2 without 
INEQ 
Age1/B 0.022 7533  827  -0.689  0.018  0.252  .106 
Age1/W 0.009  2785  519  -0.315  0.032  0.297  .193 
Age2/B 0.010 7000  663  -0.407  0.016  0.284  .189 
Age2/W -0.006  4018 601  -0.089 0.02  0.313 .151 
Age3/B 0.012 5882  540  -0.375  0.016  0.26  .163 
Age3/W -0.002  2949 341  -0.113  0.019  0.308 .185 
 
Correlation between residuals of OLS regressions estimated with and 
without  proxy for initial conditions (INEQ86) 
  total wage growth  individual premium 
AGE 1 - BLUE C.  0.920  0.920 
AGE 2 - BLUE C.   0.961  0.958 
AGE 3 - BLUE C.  0.970  0.959 
    
AGE 1 - WHITE C.  0.991  0.977 
AGE 2 - WHITE C.  0.999  0.999 
AGE 3- WHITE C.  0.999  0.999 
 
 
-  the INEQ86 coefficient is significant in all the estimated equations, 
much larger (in absolute value) in the blue-collars' equations than in the 
white-collars'.  The wage growth of white-collar workers is weakly conditioned 
by initial pay, while that of the blue-collars is strongly conditioned.   A 
different, legitimate, interpretation is that INEQ86 fails to catch the "right" 
individual characteristics of people initially hired in white-collar positions; 
-  there are interesting differences across age groups:  among young 
workers  (20-30, age-group 1) the INEQ86 coefficient is over twice as large 
as among older workers, for both white and blue-collars;    
-  the overall fit, measured by R2, is practically unaffected by the 
introduction of INEQ86 in all the white-collars' equations.  Among the blue-
collars, instead, R2 increases especially in age-groups 1 and 2; 
-  all the coefficient estimates are almost identical in the two versions of 
the white-collars' equations.  Among the blue-collars some differences are 
found  in the coefficients of industry dummies and firm-size.  They are, 
instead, very slight for the dummies that catch the effect of mobility; 
-  we have computed the correlation of  residuals with and without 
INEQ86 for all the estimated equations:  the order of magnitude is  0.92-0.97 
in the blue-collars' equations, and 0.98 and over in the white-collars' 
17. 
                                                 
17 We have also tested the contemporary correlation between the errors and the regressors 
performing the OV (omitted variable) version of the Hausmann test. This version of the 
Hausmann test suggest to test if a set of instrument for X (call it W) and the OLS residual are 
uncorrelated. This can be done by running the regression Y=Xβ +Wθ  + ε  and testing θ =0 with  26 
 
On the basis of the above, we can say that initial conditions have almost no 
impact on the wage profiles of the white-collars. They do, instead, have a 
modest impact on the blue-collars' profiles.  In either case, the influence of 
initial conditions is slightly higher at young age
18. 
 
If initial conditions reflect individual endowments  (including educational 
attainment), then one might expect them to show up especially among white-
collars, whose careers have more prospects and variability than those of 
people confined to manual jobs most of their life.  This is not the Italian case, 
and the reasons are mainly institutional:  (1) the jobs that we observe are all 
"regular" working positions, for which social security contributions are paid in 
full by the employers; (2) the vast majority, if not all, of these contracts are 
subject to collective bargaining agreements.   
This means that a university graduate in chemical engineering with high 
honours will be hired at the same conditions as an individual who has barely 
made it through college in whatever discipline. Their careers will obviously 
begin to diverge at some point, but a five-year horizon is probably not long 
enough to comprise this point.
19  Our story does not imply that the initial 
employment probabilities will be the same for the two characters:  in Italy as 
elsewhere, a chemical engineer has better chances than a generalist. But 
our study is on transitions of people already in employment, not on 
transitions from school to work.
20 
On the contrary, a young man with good vocational training will be hired as a 
qualified blue-collar at a higher level ("livello di inquadramento") than an 
unskilled individual.  Thus, initial conditions do matter for him, and his 1986- 
relative pay indeed reflects them. This is in line with what is known about the 
career profiles of manual workers in Italy, highly predetermined by collective 
bargaining agreements.
21   
 
 
6. A utility-equalizing trade-off between job security and pay?  
 
In Italy the 1986-91 period was characterised by a slow worsening of general 
economic prospects, which led into the 1990-91 recession. 
It is tempting to hypothesise a utility equalising trade-off between job security 
and pay. with some workers leaving their current position if it is perceived at 
risk, giving up some pay for longer expected tenure, and others accepting a 
higher pay with an employer more exposed to short-term fluctuations. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
an F test. We used the measure of the value added in the province as an instrumental 
variable. The F test refuses the H0 hypothesis in almost all cases. 
18 We are unable, for the time being, to detect the influence of initial conditions on those who 
achieve a career advancement (from a blue-collar to a white-collar position) in the five-year 
period under observation. 
19 In the near future we shall be able to replicate estimation on a ten-year observation period 
(1986-96), where it is reasonable to expect significant improvements over the results already 
at hand. 
20  This is another reason explaining why also in other studies of Italy's labour market 
education appears to have a modest impact on the working careers of young workers.  
21 B. Contini and C. Villosio  (1999)  27 
A job change from large to small is most likely to carry a price in terms of 
expected tenure: there is evidence of a trade-off when such moves are 
accompanied by a considerable wage (individual) premium. This pattern is 
often present among white-collars of both manufacturing and services, 
almost never among blue-collars (N-E corner of tab. A1-A4) 
The trade-off operates in opposite direction when the job change takes place 
originating from a small firm and ending up in a large one, at the price of a 
substantial cut of the wage premium. We find this occurrence only in 
manufacturing industries, touching upon both white and blue-collars (S-W 
corner of tab. A1-A4). 
Not all movers move along the trade-off. For some we observe an 
improvement on both counts (expected tenure and pay): these are 
individuals who move from small to large - young workers, white-collars in 
manufacturing, and blue-collars in the service industries; adults, white-collars 
in the services. For none, with the notable exception of workers leaving a 
downsizing firm (those for whom the DOWN variable is active), do we 
observe a worsening on both counts. 
 
If one could distinguish between quits and layoffs, empirical analysis would 
be easier. Unfortunately this is almost never the case: many quits simply pre-
empt a likely layoff. The distinction is nice in principle, almost useless in 
practice: quits are seldom revealed even in the course of in-depth interviews. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
This study aims at establishing how mobility affected individual wages in the 
five-year period 1986-91, characterized by a slow worsening of Italy's 
economic position, leading into the 1990-91 recession. 
 
We decompose individual wage change 1986-91 in two parts: the mean 
wage growth observed across firms of origin and firms of destination (the two 
coincide for the stayers), and the wage premium gained over the mean wage 
change by movers attributable to their own personal characteristics. 
 
Our analysis is a preliminary attempt to investigate factors that influence 
wage growth. While individual and firm specific characteristics yield results 
that are in line with other findings, the introduction of variables related to 
mobility patterns allows to focus  how job changes affect wage growth. 
 
It should be emphasized that all the evidence gathered in this study applies 
to workers, whose history has been observed from 1986 to 1991, and are 
reported at work in 1991. For instance, workers in their 40's who left an 
establishment during downsizing or for whatever reason, and are no longer 
in the panel in 1991, may have become self-employed and be quite well off 
(a rough estimate puts this number at 10% of all separations - cfr. Contini et 
al. 1996). More likely, they are long term-unemployed and much worse off 
than their "observable" colleagues, still in the panel in 1991.  
The importance of being in a closed panel, as opposed to an open panel, 
may be assessed by the probability of attrition (OUT = leaving the panel, and  28 
not having re-entered by 1994), conditional to jobs of given duration held in 
1991 for male workers, less than 45 yrs. of age, estimated as follows
22 : 
 
Prob [OUT (94) / (job length < 3 months in 1991) ] = 0.50 
Prob [OUT (94) / (job length between 6 and 11 months in 1991) ] = 0.15 
 
The attrition probability at (t + T) is very much dependent on the length of 
one's employment spell at (t) - in our exercise T = 3 years. 
The vast majority of those who are out in 1994 are, unless retired, in bad 
economic conditions compared to those who are still in the panel. 
 
Given these premises, here is a summary of our main findings: 
(i)  In general, movers do better than stayers at young age (20-30), but 
the difference tends to vanish, especially for manual workers as age 
progresses; 
(ii)  mover-stayer differentials are larger among white-collars than blue-
collars, in line with the higher variance of earnings of the former; 
(iii)  total wage growth is driven by the wage - firm size positive correlation 
only for the blue-collars: job-switches from small to large firms often 
yield substantial pay improvements relative to stayers; job switches 
from large to small size often end up in wage cuts. For the white-
collars, however, job changes in either direction tend to improve one's 
position relative to stayers; 
(iv)  there is a quasi-reverse pattern on the individual premiums of the 
blue-collars (switches from small to large carry negative coefficients, 
from large to small positive). This is likely to be a consequence of firm-
based wage policies, the impact of which by far exceeds that 
attributable to individual characteristics 
(v)  personal characteristics contribute, instead, to determine the white-
collars' individual premiums. Job changes of adult and mature 
workers, presumably endowed with skills and experience, result in 
sizeable wage gains; 
(vi)  all workers employed at firms that go through drastic employment 
cuts, or exit the market altogether in the period 1986-91, suffer severe 
wage losses by 1991; 
(vii)  prolonged unemployment spells have somewhat of a negative impact 
on the wage growth of white-collar employees (up to 5 p.p.), almost 
none on the blue-collars; 
(viii)  a certain amount of job-switching has a positive effect on the wage 
growth of the younger white-collars. If job changes become too 
frequent, however, its positive impact vanishes; 
(ix)  we find a rather strong effect of initial conditions on the wage profile of 
blue-collar employees, and almost none on the white-collars'; 
(x)  there is evidence of a trade-off between job security and pay in 
concomitance with a job-to-job switch. When adverse shocks are in 
sight - as was the beginning of the Nineties - it is reasonable that 
people may leave their current position, if it is perceived at risk, giving 
up some pay for longer expected tenure, or may choose to accept a 
higher pay with a less reliable (i.e. more exposed to short-term 
fluctuations) employer. 
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